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Abstract 
This paper critically examines the impact of decentralization on contemporary and future 
governance arrangements in Ghana’s artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) sector. The sector, 
while providing valuable employment in rural areas, is beleaguered by environmental and social 
issues. Proponents of decentralization argue that re-distributing decision-making authority leads to 
more responsive, transparent and efficient natural resource management. The analysis presented 
here, however, demonstrates how weak decentralization has exacerbated the complex, conflictual 
and clandestine nature of local resource politics surrounding ASM. If future decentralization reforms 
are going to reverse this trend and improve the governance of ASM in Ghana, then facilitating the 
participation of traditional authorities is imperative. It is argued that doing so requires addressing 
the reticence regarding the role of chiefs in resource governance; simply ironing out existing 
technical issues with decentralization reforms is unlikely to improve the social and environmental 
performance of ASM in the country. In light of the chronic resource management deficiencies in 
Ghana, epitomized in the ASM sector, fostering frank political debates on resource governance is 
becoming urgent. 
 
Key Words: Decentralization, Natural Resource Management, Artisanal Mining, Ghana 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
1. Introduction 
The global burgeoning of artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM)1 activities has presented policy-
makers with a dilemma. On the one hand, more than 100 million people depend on the sector which 
directly employs 20-30 million people in approximately 70 countries [1,2,3]; and, on the other, the 
sector is associated with a range of environmental and social problems [4, 5, 6]. Furthermore, a poor 
understanding of the sector has undermined attempts to regulate and formalize its activities [7, 8, 
9].  
The relatively nascent literature on the sector has focused predominantly on understanding its 
principal protagonists [e.g. 10, 11, 12, 13], the challenges associated with reforming the sector [e.g. 
9, 14, 15] and on environmental issues, particularly the (mis-)use of mercury [e.g. 5, 16, 17, 18]. 
Apart from analyses of the impact of structural adjustment on the sector [19, 20], very little 
attention has been paid to the influence of broader governance trends on ASM, including 
decentralization. This paper broadens understanding of ASM governance dynamics by reviewing the 
influence of decentralization reforms on the sector in Ghana. 
Ghana is an illustrative case to examine because it has a vibrant, but poorly managed, ASM sector 
and is committed to deepening and accelerating the process of decentralization [19, 21]. The 
analysis presented is based on a series of semi-structured interviews conducted at the national and 
regional levels, as well as local sites around Kibi in the Eastern Region, Bibiani in the Western Region 
and Obuasi in the Ashanti Region of the country. Between November 2011 and August 2012 a total 
of 87 interviews were conducted with key stakeholders in the sector, principally, miners2, national 
and regional level government officials, district level officials and local elected politicians, non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) and traditional authorities.  
The paper begins by reviewing the contemporary context and critiques of decentralization reforms 
in general, and then in Ghana specifically. Larson [23] argues that the natural resource management 
literature tends to focus on the participation of resource-users under decentralized governance 
regimes; therefore, this paper revolves around the role of District Assemblies in the ASM sector. The 
discussion shows how the politicisation of the ostensibly non-partisan District Assemblies represents 
an important characteristic in the largely clandestine nature of local ASM politics.  
The role of chiefs under decentralized regimes is also reviewed before the penultimate section 
reflects on the implications of future reforms on the Ghanaian ASM sector. It is argued that 
integrating traditional sources of authority into decentralization reforms is imperative if they are to 
have any substantive impact on ASM governance. Doing so, however, requires a willingness to 
address the reticence regarding these issues which appears to be paralysing donors and 
governments; simply ironing out existing issues with reforms, such as the unelected nature of 
District Chief Executives, is unlikely to improve the social and environmental performance of ASM in 
the country. Civil society organisations, such as small-scale miners’ associations, are also introduced 
                                                          
1 The labour-intensive, low-tech extraction and processing of precious minerals. 
2 Describing participants in the sector as miners is convenient, but masks the heterogeneity of roles and 
activities in the sector. These include, for example, ore carriers, washers, excavator drivers, sponsors, land-
owners, and buyers [22].  
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as potentially fruitful avenues for reconciling the diverse and diffuse sources of authority that govern 
the sector. 
 
2. Rhetoric and reality: Decentralizing natural resource governance 
2.1 The rise of the Good Governance agenda: Delivering conflict, complexity and corruption?  
Decentralization broadly entails the shifting of responsibility for decision-making from central to 
local institutions. Rondinelli and Cheema [24] distinguish between four types of decentralization: 1) 
deconcentration of authority from centrally located government agencies to non-autonomous field-
based administrations; 2) delegation of decision-making and management authority to quasi-
autonomous institutions; 3) devolution, the transfer of authority to independent and autonomous 
local government, and; 4) privatisation, where non-state organisations assume responsibility for 
management. Reforms generally contain a mixture of these strategies and they are generally 
promoted in order to increase transparency, accountability and broaden democratic participation in 
decision-making. This, it is argued, makes local government service providers more responsive to 
local requirements, and further improves the allocative efficiency and equity of resource allocation 
by reducing opportunities and incentives for corruption [25, 26]. 
The rationale for decentralization is also reflected in the natural resource management sector where 
there is broad agreement that centralised resource management has failed to deliver sustainable 
and equitable outcomes [27]. Potentially positive outcomes of decentralized natural resource 
governance include the empowerment of local people to protect resources, increased revenues for 
local councils and people, particularly in marginal and disadvantaged groups and increasingly 
sustainable resource-use [28, 29]. The potential for advances in resource governance is reflected in a 
broad body of literature which supports the drive for decentralization by demonstrating that natural 
resource management is most effective when local users participate in rule-making and enforcing, 
decision-makers are downwardly and horizontally accountable, local institutions are endowed with 
discretionary powers and there is investment in their capacity [29, 30, 31, 32].  
Although decentralization has long been promoted as a central component of development 
strategies across the world, most recently, it has been co-opted by the Bretton Woods institutes 
under the guise of the Good Governance agenda. This agenda emerged after the Cold War as a 
conceptual framework by which to assess and enable reform of international financial assistance 
which could no longer be justified on the basis of political expediency [33]. Furthermore, the failure 
of donor-led structural adjustment packages (SAPs) to deliver substantive economic or social 
development necessitated the adoption of a new approach. The Good Governance agenda 
effectively represents a set of new conditionalities aimed at making governance participatory, 
consensus orientated, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, equitable, and 
subject to the rule of law [34]. 
In order to preserve the notionally apolitical remit of the World Bank, the Good Governance agenda 
has been promoted as a technocratic pursuit. However, as Williams [35] points out, the Good 
Governance discourse is rooted in Western political philosophy and as a result the mandated 
reforms merely reflect the neoliberal hegemony. The ostensibly country-led Poverty Reduction 
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Strategy Papers (PRSPs) are saturated with the language of Good Governance, but they tend to 
promote the same distinctly neoliberal reforms contained in their predecessors, the SAPs [36]. The 
pursuit of decentralization, for example, has persisted through the changing donor rhetoric. This is 
typified in the Ghanaian PRSP [21:99], which states:  
Promoting citizen’s participation in local governance will necessarily require accelerating the 
process of devolution of political power to the district and sub-district structures. 
Strengthening local governance within the concept of democratic principles implies getting 
the people involved in decision-making, especially grassroots participation to ensure a 
bottom-up approach to governance. This is necessary to nurture, uphold and entrench the 
principles of transparency and accountability in governance processes. 
Despite the failure of centralised resource management and the corresponding policy focus on 
decentralization, the resistance of central authorities to cede authority has undermined governance 
reforms, a problem exacerbated by poor funding and implementation [28, 29]. In practice, 
decentralization initiatives have precipitated power struggles over resources which complicate, and 
as Berry [37] argues, sometimes subvert the processes of development and democratisation they 
are intended to support. Local elites co-opting the political agency of communities in decentralized 
contexts can represent a significant barrier to broad and equitable benefits accruing from 
governance reforms. The decentralization of corruption as a result of inadequate local accountability 
is amongst the key factors which lead Batterbury and Fernando [38:3] to argue that: ‘New 
governance regimes alter the range of powers and the capabilities of state and civil society actors, in 
ways that are often at odds with the goals of the proponents of “good” governance.’ 
The altered power arrangements under decentralized governance regimes can exacerbate conflicts 
over natural resources [39]. These conflicts are often rooted in the differences between customary 
and statutory land tenure. Under the simplistic economic assumption that customary tenure was 
insecure and failed to incentivise investment and modernisation, early donor-led decentralization 
policies prioritised clarifying land tenure.  However, the failure of land reforms to precipitate 
investment and deliver reductions in poverty amongst the land ‘insecure’, combined with the 
criticism that reforms are being used to facilitate widespread ‘land grabbing’ [40], means that 
international land policy increasingly emphasises the importance of incorporating customary tenure 
agreements into statute to ensure more equitable and sustainable land management [41, 42] .   
Peters [43] contends, however, that the focus on disproving the economistic fallacy that customary 
tenure is inherently insecure has led to the development of a conventional wisdom which 
emphasises and celebrates the negotiability, flexibility and agency of local actors. This stands at odds 
with evidence of increasingly competitive and conflictual land relations. Decentralization reforms 
which address land tenure often view customary rights as immutably traditional and informal, when 
they are in fact fluid constructs and have been heavily influenced by the colonial period and events 
since. Ubink and Quan [44] demonstrate how chiefs in Ghana, for example, are constructing 
customary rules which serve their own interest at the expense of equitable land-use.  
Evidently, the drive for decentralization and the implementation of the Good Governance agenda 
has had a profound effect on resource governance. But, despite propounding to deliver sustainable 
and equitable resource management, reforms have generally failed to account for local elite 
capture, increased the complexity of resource management land tenure regimes and intensified 
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conflicts over resources, particularly at the local level [38, 45, 46, 47]. In the ASM sector, however, 
the relevance and impact of decentralization reforms has received minimal attention. Before 
examining the contemporary dynamics of ASM in Ghana under decentralization, it is instructive to 
contextualise the analysis by reviewing the country’s decentralization experience. 
 
2.2 Decentralization in Ghana: A historical review 
It is often assumed that resource management in Ghana, and elsewhere, was characterised by 
strong centralised control in the colonial era, a feature which has broadly been sustained since. 
Undoubtedly, there was a dramatic re-shaping of authority during the colonial era, but in the natural 
resources sector this was not always the oppressive, imperialistic and militarised process which it is 
often portrayed as. In the mining sector, for example, the refusal of local operators to pay tributes to 
the chiefs during the late 19th century expedited agreements between chiefs and European mining 
companies. Despite the subsequent state-led attempts to formalise the resultant market in 
concessions, land-use was primarily dictated by indigenous authorities in alliance with metropolitan 
and European traders [48].  
Centralised control over mineral resources in Ghana was precipitated by a collapse in the industry 
which led to the eventual nationalisation of all but two of the country’s mines shortly after 
independence [49]. Dissatisfaction with the increasingly centralised and dictatorial Nkrumah regime, 
however, led to a series of coup d’etats starting in 1966. During the subsequent period of military 
domination and political instability, the country, under the leadership of Jerry Rawlings and the 
Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC), embarked on the Bretton Woods sponsored Economic 
Recovery Programme (ERP) [50]. In an attempt to increase the legitimacy of the Rawlings 
government and address popular concerns regarding the austerity introduced by the ERP, the 
country revitalised decentralization reforms [51, 52]. Decentralization was further embedded after 
the 1992 democratic elections; the constitution adopted by a nationwide referendum requires the 
state to ‘make democracy a reality by decentralizing the administrative and financial machinery of 
government to the regions and districts by affording all possible opportunities to the people to 
participate in decision-making at every level in national life and government’.3     
The centre-piece of contemporary decentralization is the District Assembly, formally recognised 
under the PNDC Law 207 [51]. These remain central to recent reforms, including the National 
Decentralization Action Plan 2003-2005 and the Decentralization Policy Review mandated in the 
National Democratic Congress (NDC) 2008 election manifesto [53]. To date, six Metropolitan, 49 
Municipal and 161 District Assemblies4 have been created which are distributed under 10 Regional 
Coordinating Councils [54]. The 1993 Local Government Act 462 made local authorities responsible 
for the overall development in their district, a function which is executed through the Executive 
Committee, supported by, inter alia, the Development Planning, Social Services and the Justice and 
Security sub-committees. Despite the progression of decentralization reforms, criticisms of the 
                                                          
3 Chapter 6, Section 35, Clause 6d 
4 Under these assemblies are a series of councils which are designated by the size and character of their area. 
Under Metropolitan councils are the sub-metropolitan district councils; under Municipal assemblies are a 
series of zonal councils, and; under District Assemblies are Urban/Town/Rural councils and Unit Committees 
which are the smallest unit of local governance with populations between 500 and 2,500 people. 
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process in Ghana reflect those of the broader literature; it has had limited success due to reluctance 
of central government to cede power, limited fiscal autonomy, fragmented institutions and lack of 
organisational support [52, 55, 56]. 
Although decentralization in Ghana has been widely reviewed, its impact on the ASM sector has 
received limited attention. This paper goes on to contextualise debates on ASM in Ghana and 
examine the role of District Authorities in the sector. As District Assemblies are mandated to be 
sensitive to existing local political structures, the analysis also considers the role of chiefs in the 
sector. This provides the basis for reflecting on the future of ASM in Ghana under deepening and 
accelerating decentralization reforms.   
 
3. Decentralization and artisanal and small-scale mining in Ghana 
3.1 Artisanal and small-scale mining in Ghana: A poorly understood sector 
For more than a millennium, small-scale gold mining has been a central component in Ghana’s 
economy and in many places the low-tech, labour intensive techniques used for centuries remain 
recognisable [49]. In the decades since Ghana undertook structural adjustment the ASM sector has 
seen burgeoning growth, such that it now employs between 1 and 2 million people and is 
responsible for approximately 10% of national gold production5. This growth has been driven 
predominantly by a deagrarianisation in response to the failure of agriculture to provide adequate 
livelihoods to the country’s rural communities, low barriers to entry, a large employment-seeking 
labour-force resulting from the entrenchment of public sector workers and cyclical-poverty 
preventing miners from readily abandoning activities (14, 57)  
In national discourse, popular depictions of the sector characterise galamsey6 as opportunistic 
criminals looking to ‘get-rich quick’ and the sector as a whole a ‘threat’ and ‘menace’, largely as a 
consequence of the environmental degradation associated with activities [5, 19]. A more nuanced, 
and increasingly widely accepted perspective, however, appreciates that although some people 
engaging with galamsey may be investing in ASM as a means to increase their wealth, in most 
circumstances poverty is a critical factor for explaining the sector’s growth. While acknowledging the 
environmental and social issues which plague the sector, this position also highlights the economic 
importance of the sector in areas where there are few other productive alternatives.  
A superficial understanding of the dynamics and nuances of the sector compounded by a lack of 
basic census work [58], however, has undermined attempts to control the widespread 
environmental and social costs associated with ASM through formalisation, promotion of alternative 
livelihoods and military intervention. The financially and bureaucratically burdensome formalisation 
process [7, 20] in particular has exacerbated marginalisation in the sector, such that only an 
estimated 10% of activities operate on legal concessions7. Although the creation of small-scale 
miners’ associations has improved the representation of formal small-scale operators [59], the illegal 
                                                          
5 Estimates from interview with government official [see also 2, 19] 
6 The word galamsey, meaning gather them and sell, is widely used in Ghana to refer to small-scale miners and 
their activities.  
7 Estimate from interview with government official. 
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nature of most activities has distanced government officials, policy-makers and official assistance 
from the sector. Furthermore, the illegality associated with the sector encourages a considerable 
lack of transparency regarding it’s dynamics. If future interventions are to address the lack of 
transparency and poor understanding surrounding the sector and related mis-guided policy 
formulation, then articulating ASM governance accurately is essential.  
The following section contributes to developing a more nuanced understanding of ASM in Ghana by 
contrasting the formal and informal involvement of District Assemblies and their members in the 
sector. The analysis sheds light on the sector’s local dynamics, drawing attention to the politicisation 
of the ostensibly non-partisan District Assemblies and how the limited extent of decentralization has 
resulted in local level political actors assuming ambiguous stances on ASM in order to accommodate 
the national discourse, which posits ASM as a social and environment threat on the one hand, with 
the local economic benefits accruing to their constituents on the other. Reviewing the role of chiefs 
in the sector highlights how decentralization has failed to facilitate the participation of key 
stakeholders in governance processes which exacerbates the complexities and ambiguities created 
by decentralization in Ghana. 
 
3.2 District Assemblies: Hands of the president or an advocacy NGO? 
Formally, the role of District Assemblies8 in the ASM sector is restricted to communicating and 
endorsing applications for small-scale mining concessions. Applications for the 25 hectare 
concessions, along with maps of the area, are received from the Minerals Commission and posted on 
the relevant District Assembly and affected community’s notice board for 21 days. During this time 
any objections or comments are gathered, and then the application is either approved or rejected by 
the District Chief Executive. In addition to the comments of the community, this decision should be 
informed by, and integrated into, the District’s development and environmental planning. In reality, 
however, the power to endorse or reject application is reducible to the Chief Executive. As one 
assembly man explained in an interview: 
Sometimes the Chief Executive passes things quickly because the assembly only meet every 
quarter, but sometimes he passes things quickly because he knows it will not be popular and 
it might not pass. So the assembly can be left out and sometimes it is good as things happen 
quickly, but sometimes it [the assembly] fails to prevent things it would like to have a say in. 
Furthermore, although the Chief Executive is ostensibly non-partisan, a commonly noted complaint 
amongst communities and assembly-men is that the appointment of the Chief Executive by the 
president effectively politicises the District Assembly9. This politicisation has consequences for both 
the granting of licences and assemblies’ attempts to regulate the 90% of ASM which is illegal. District 
Assemblies attempt to address illegal mining through various sub-committees, principally 
development and environmental planning committees, but in some locations the security sub-
committee is also involved. One District Planning Officer explained how they garnered support from 
                                                          
8 This discussion focuses on District Assemblies because ASM occurs predominantly in rural areas and, 
therefore, it is District Assemblies, rather than Metropolitan and Municipal Assemblies, which are most often 
involved with the sector.  
9 Approximately two-thirds of the assembly is constituted of elected assembly members.  
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central government and brought the military to clear some of the illegal mining in the area, but 
noted that, as the assembly is financially responsible for the soldiers’ food, fuel, vehicles and 
accommodation, and that the interventions are usually ineffective due to their temporary nature.  
There is little transparency in decision-making regarding security interventions in the ASM sector. As 
one miner alluded to during an interview: 
I don’t know why the soldiers come. But the sponsors don’t all belong to one party, so they 
will call the soldiers when they see someone from another party mining [illegally]. Most of 
the sponsors around here are NPP [New Patriotic Party], so when someone from the NDC 
[National Democratic Congress] sees you, he will inform the chief or the assembly and 
people in Accra and they will bring the military to disturb you. 
Due to the illegal nature of most ASM activities, these political dynamics are clandestine and there is 
considerable hearsay involved. Most political figures hold ambiguous positions on ASM; on the one 
hand, aligning themselves with the national discourse requires upholding the sector as a ‘menace’ 
threatening the environment, health and social wellbeing of communities [5], and on the other, ASM 
represents the primary economic activity of their constituents and, in some cases, a means to fund 
political campaigns.  
In addition to the politicisation of District Assemblies’ involvement with the ASM sector leading to 
ambiguous approaches to managing the sector, their formal involvement is further limited by the 
lack of autonomy to co-ordinate with other ministries. Although the Minerals Commission and 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) have had their authority deconcentrated under 
decentralization [20], neither the District Assemblies nor the District Offices of these institutions 
have the power to implement collaborative programs without central permission. This limits local 
government authorities’ influence over local land-use change and forces them to operate in an 
extremely fragmented institutional environment. As one District Assistant Co-ordinator explained in 
an interview:   
Even though we are supposed to be implementing decentralization, the arm of central 
government is very heavy upon us. The central government appoints the chief executive... 
But the Minerals Commission and EPA are not well decentralized either, so even the chief 
executive has no power over their actions. It makes the District Assembly have very little 
power. 
The lack of autonomy at the district level and the resultant sense of powerlessness is manifested in 
some District Officials who, in wanting to address illegal ASM, aspire to partner with conservation 
NGOs which lobby for tighter control of the sector. This highlights the heterogeneity of positions 
held within District Assemblies towards ASM, and mining more generally. It also reveals some of the 
tangible difficulties of balancing sometimes ambiguous and contradictory political, and personal, 
imperatives. As one Assembly Planning Officer explained in an interview:  
The assembly can only affectively try to advocate and agitate for the welfare of the people, 
we are trying to take the galamsey on. But central government controls everything, 
including the revenues from mining... What we’re praying for is that some NGOs will come 
and partner with the assembly, because they can get to the people, they have a 
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decentralized control and so they can represent the views of the people only. They don’t 
have to hold their tongue when something bad is happening, and they don’t have to worry 
about their jobs like we do here.   
Weak decentralization has not rendered District Assemblies an irrelevancy for the ASM sector, but 
rather, it has advanced an abstruse politicisation of local resource governance. It has also 
contributed to a blurring of institutional boundaries as local actors vie for control over the sector, 
either by involving themselves for financial gain, or by exploring avenues to advocate for stronger 
interventions. The potential partnerships between District Assemblies and NGOs evolving out of 
these low-level conflicts over resource management typify the complex mosaics of authority which 
emerge from incomplete decentralization. They also highlight the proliferation of non-state actors 
who are poorly recognised in policy, yet command considerable authority of resource governance. 
Considering decentralization reforms, the most notable of these, conspicuous by their absence, is 
the chiefs. Despite their lack of formal involvement and the relative reticence regarding their role, 
chiefs are central to the dynamics of ASM in Ghana. Any review of decentralization and ASM, 
therefore, would be incomplete without due consideration given to their importance. The following 
section examines their position within decentralized resource governance and ASM dynamics which 
leads into an examination of potential future trends in the sector. 
 
3. 3 Chiefs: Legitimate partners for development or at war with modernism? 
Chiefs have been central to mineral development in Ghana for centuries; and, while they are not 
formally recognised in the legal framework, they remain pivotal to ASM dynamics in the country [19, 
49]. They are principally involved, along with land owners, in granting access to land for mining, but 
some also sponsor activities and collect royalties in return for their continuing support to miners. 
Although formally, District Assemblies are required to integrate chiefs as partners for development, 
in reality the relationship between District Assemblies and traditional authorities is poorly clarified 
and often contentious [60]. This, combined with the variety of positions taken by chiefs towards 
ASM, exacerbates the clandestine politics of the sector. Nonetheless, it is apparent that chiefs are 
powerful actors in governing land-use in Ghana, and, as the following section argues, their relative 
neglect in decentralization is an important factors to consider in future reforms.  
The British policy of indirect rule disrupted well-organised and established political systems and 
institutions for governing natural resources based on the chieftaincy system.  Rather than strip the 
chieftaincy of power, the policy supported and emphasised the role of paramount chiefs as the most 
practical and affordable system of administering the country. It did, however, abrogate the 
sovereignty of the Ghanaian chiefs, such that their tenure depended no longer on the consent and 
approval of their people, but on the Governor’s pleasure [61].  
Since independence the institution of chieftaincy has continued to be held in high-esteem. The 1992 
constitution extended chiefly authority over land in the North, where previously it had been held by 
the state [37, 44]. In local government, however, the role of chiefs has been inconsistent and 
remains unclear. As Ayee [60:6] explains, the provision in the 1957 constitution for a third of local 
government units to be composed of chiefs was overturned in the 1961 constitution which 
‘banished’ traditional authorities from local government. This trend was repeated in the following 
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decades; the 1969 constitution mandated local government units to contain a third of their 
membership from traditional authorities, again overturned in the 1988 Local Government Law which 
regarded the participation of chiefs in District Assemblies as counter-revolutionary and 
undemocratic. 
Currently, the Regional Coordinating Council has two representatives from the Regional House of 
Chiefs, and while there is no other provision for traditional authorities, they may be among the third 
of the assembly appointed by the President. The lack of representation in District Assemblies and 
reduction of responsibilities to land consultations and ceremonial functions has, Ayee [60] argues, 
often rendered the relationship between assemblies and chiefs strained. The challenge with this 
difficult relationship is evident in the ASM sector. The district can find it difficult to regulate activities 
without the support of the chief, as one District Officer explained in an interview:  
The miners also go into partnership with concession owners, as well as partnering the land 
owners and the chiefs. This is what makes our life difficult. 
Reflecting the ambiguity and range of positions displayed in local state politics, Ghanaian chiefs also 
take a range of positions on ASM. In general, the personal and community-wide financial benefits 
accruing from the activity ensure their support. In one area in the Western Region, where ASM is 
occurring within a forest reserve, an Odikro10 explained how he supported mining in an interview:  
Initially we panned for gold in the rivers and did roadpicking11 and then the mining gradually 
grew. We started with excavators in 2006, but then the forestry came and tried to make us 
stop. But I told them we should be allowed to do some as the activity is from our forefathers 
and we came to some agreement. 
Miners in the Eastern Region also confirmed the centrality of chiefs in supporting the sector, saying 
during interviews:  
The chiefs are seconding us. They want everyone to eat, to be free, because they are 
Ghanaian. 
The chief gives a chance to mine to those who are following him, and he controls the 
soldiers.  
Although chiefs are central to ASM dynamics in the country, their involvement in a sector which is 
predominantly illegal and widely associated with considerable environmental and social damage 
makes their role a subject of considerable contention. An incident with a District Official recorded in 
the researcher’s field notes alludes to this:  
After my interview with [120725], I was chatting with Tabi and [120725] came over and took 
me to one side and re-iterated to me that they did not say the chiefs are involved with 
providing the land for mining, or with mining in anyway. He said, they don’t know how the 
                                                          
10 Local village ‘caretaker’ chief. 
11 Roadpicking refers to the practice of collecting gold from the land which is brought to the surface by heavy 
rains. 
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miners get the land at all, and they don’t know anything about the chiefs. It was interesting 
that he felt he had to impress on me that this had definitely not been said. 
The contention surrounding the role of traditional authorities in ASM is exacerbated by the stance 
taken by some chiefs against galamsey. One chief bemoaned, during an interview, the negative 
impact of mining, as well as the lack of power chiefs had over the activities:  
Some of the miners have no agreement with the chief or the land owner. They are just 
stealing, spoiling the river and ruining cash crops. It causes great havoc in the communities... 
I can’t even stop the mining on my own farm.  
The most notable example of traditional authorities standing against illegal ASM is the Okyenhene12 
who established an environmental foundation and a taskforce to address deforestation and illegal 
mining around the Atewa Forest reserve near Kibi, Eastern Region. The task force is effectively 
defunct, however, as the ‘palace boys’ who were responsible for combating the mining, have, 
according to miners in the area, ‘left and gone into the mining’.13 Locally, the issue is divisive 
because some ASM activities are happening in the area immediately juxtaposing the Okyenhene’s 
house. Some members of the community question whether he is genuinely committed to combating 
the activities; they posit that he must be involved, and is therefore corrupt and benefiting from the 
activities.  
While the role of chiefs is varied, politicised and often unclear, what remains beyond doubt is their 
importance in the sector. Reflecting on the challenges with regulating ASM in the district one district 
officer argued:   
People might agitate, but to what effect, what power do they have? Some have succeeded 
with the help and power of chiefs, but without the chief, they don’t have any power. 
These interactions, and those reviewed previously, are far removed from the ASM policy context; 
and, as the next section elucidates, as long as decentralization reforms continue to skirt around 
these substantive determinants of ASM governance, they are unlikely to deliver the expected 
improvements governance and corollary amelioration of environmental and social conditions in the 
sector.  
 
4. Future decentralization trends and implications for artisanal and small-scale mining 
Having reviewed the governance dynamics of the Ghanaian ASM sector with regard to local 
government and traditional authorities, this section reflects on the future of ASM in light of the 
impending intensification of decentralization reforms. The discussion begins by outlining key areas 
of concern regarding current reforms, noting important areas for future decentralization planned 
under the Natural Resources and Environmental Governance (NREG) project. It then goes on to 
argue that, by adopting the rhetoric of accountability and transparency associated with 
decentralization but failing to articulate how reforms intend to address the patently political and 
predominantly clandestine nature of local ASM dynamics, the drive for deepening decentralization 
                                                          
12 The Paramount Chief of the Akyem Abuakwa.  
13 Interview with a miner 
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seems unlikely to deliver any substantive changes to the sector. Any improvements that might be 
derived from decentralization require going beyond pursuing rhetorical goals of transparency and 
accountability and engaging substantively with broader debates regarding the incommensurability of 
reforms based on liberal participatory democracy and important, non-state, sources of authority 
over land-use.  
Although there is a broad movement away from state-based donor interventions towards market-
based programs [62, 63], decentralization remains a central component of development plans in 
Ghana and elsewhere. Decentralization is often framed as a technical and internal political matter. 
But, as Mohan [51] explains, external involvement has a profound effect on the emerging political 
dynamics. In Ghana’s ASM sector, donor involvement, and the resultant national policy focus, is 
currently channelled predominantly through the NREG program. This World Bank led project aims to 
harmonise environment and resource management issues which have historically been fragmented 
across the multitude of donors active in Ghana. In the ASM sector, the NREG program is specifically 
concerned with identifying suitable areas for activities and improving the formalisation process in 
the sector. More broadly, the program builds on the PRSP which, as noted previously, calls for a 
strengthening and acceleration of the decentralization process, especially focussing on building 
decentralized environmental capacity at district levels and decentralizing the Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA) process.  
There are, however, several issues with existing decentralization reforms which will require 
addressing before future reforms can be expected to improve ASM management. These include the 
poor alignment between district level offices and the lack of political and fiscal autonomy at a district 
level. These issues, as will be explained below, drastically undermine the notion that 
decentralization furthers policy responsiveness, accountability and transparency.  
Where partial decentralization has occurred, for example through the establishment of District 
Minerals Commission offices, there is often poor alignment between the jurisdiction of Minerals 
Commission offices and District Assemblies. This is partly due to the relatively large area of authority 
that ministry district offices have compared with administrative districts; there are 11 district offices 
for the Minerals Commission, compared to 216 Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies. The 
resultant mismatch of jurisdictions compounds the poorly clarified nature of the relationship 
between district offices of ministries and District Assemblies. Additionally, as noted above, there is 
little autonomy at the district level for collaboration between agencies. Expecting the creation of 
new district EPA offices, a central component of the NREG program, to increase accountability and 
transparency of environmental management without linking them explicitly to district development 
and environmental planning sub-committees seems unrealistic. Continued disconnection between 
state agencies, as well as other key actors, also reduces the likelihood that policy and management 
will be responsive to local requirements.  
The lack of revenue generating capacity and the lack of power over fiscal considerations at the 
district level are also noted as further key barriers to decentralization [56]. Furthermore, several 
District Assemblies have years of unaudited accounts due to the overstretched and unevenly 
distributed nature of the Ghana Audit Service [21]. This evidently undermines the theoretical gains 
in transparency and accountability associated with decentralization. The unelected positions within 
District Assemblies, particularly the District Chief Executive, further exacerbate these issues. Ribot 
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[64] argues that only elected representatives are accountable to their populations, a contention 
asserted by one Assemblyman in an interview:  
Personally, I believe he [District Chief Executive] should be elected. It would help make them 
more responsible to the people. Then there would be some mechanism where he can be 
removed if he is not performing. As is stands he only works for the government and as long 
as he is doing ok by them, he can’t be removed, no matter what the communities think. 
The common assumption underlying these critiques of decentralization in Ghana is that increasing 
decentralization and ironing out technical issues will result in the delivery of the potential benefits 
espoused. In the case of ASM, however, proponents of decentralization fail to recognise that there is 
already extremely limited centralised control over the sector. The state, through a poorly framed 
and implemented formalisation program, has legislated itself out of direct control, and driven a large 
proportion of the governance of the sector into the shadows. The ASM sector in Ghana already 
operates in a decentralized fashion, but in a non-state realm. Accordingly, future reforms, if they are 
to have any substantive impact on the sector, should focus on how to integrate the existing 
dynamics of the sector into state apparatus. This contention does not suggest that addressing 
current weaknesses and issues in decentralization reform is unnecessary, but rather emphasises the 
importance of engaging meaningfully with local realities; deepening and accelerating 
decentralization in Ghana may be necessary to address governance in the ASM sector, but it will not 
be sufficient per se.   
In addition to recognising ASM as conduit for economic and political rent-seeking at the district level, 
the centrality of chiefs to the governance of ASM in Ghana means their involvement in decision-
making is imperative. Without the participation of traditional authorities, decisions made regarding 
ASM at the district-level will continue to have minimal influence on the de facto operation of the 
sector. Reconciling customary and statutory governance arrangements has been noted previously as 
a prerequisite for successful management in the ASM sector [65, 66]. As Denney [62] highlights, 
however, the donor shift away from state-led reform based on liberal participatory democracy 
towards engaging with non-state actors is problematic. In Sierra Leone the UK Department for 
International Development (DFID), the author [62] explains, only flirted superficially with chieftaincy 
reform as they only partially understood the context and complexity of traditional authority.  
This suggests that when the involvement of non-state actors potentially violates the liberal 
democratic principles on which donors base their interventions, there is a tendency to neglect 
important actors in reforms. The almost total omission of chiefs from NREG proposals, which only 
mention chiefs as custodians of the land, supports this contention. The importance of traditional 
authorities transcends the ASM sector and it is well noted in Ghana [60, 61].  But, the reticence of 
donors regarding the issue does nothing to encourage the political discussions required to resolve 
the existing antagonism between state and traditional authorities. The activities of donors 
distracting environmental managers from issues of importance is compounded by the state policy of 
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non-interference with ‘chieftaincy issues’14, something which Ubink and Quan [44] suggest is so 
pervasive that it prevents an accurate and open articulation of land-based issues in Ghana.  
The growing stature of small-scale miners’ associations may provide some potential for civil-society 
institutions to play a role in bridging the diverse and separate sources of authority in the ASM sector. 
The formation of the National Small-scale Miners’ Association was encouraged by the Ghana 
Chamber of Mines so that small-scale miners could have a federation which represents them at the 
Chamber level [59]. In addition to national representation, local branches of the association are 
actively engaged with representing the interests of small-scale miners and acting as a mediator in 
ASM-related conflicts. The effectiveness and desirability of these institutions is evidenced by the 
formation of an informal small-scale miners association in Obuasi, a town noted for its resource 
conflicts. Even though activities remain illegal, this organisation is proving indispensable in resolving 
conflicts between illegal miners, large-scale mining companies and communities and is effectively 
ensuring the legitimate representation and participation of local resource-users in decision-making 
and resource-use management [67]. Supporting and encouraging the formation of civic institutions 
such as formal and informal small-scale miners’ associations could augment existing decentralization 
reforms and provide a platform for overcoming the current impasse between state and traditional 
authorities.  
Addo-Fening [61] notes how chiefs’ popular legitimacy could be harnessed to cement the democratic 
gains of the preceding decades. However, despite being central to resource governance, 
propounding their involvement in democratic processes such as decentralization poses considerable 
challenges, because, as Ribot [64] points out, they ‘may not represent or be accountable to local 
populations’. The participation of traditional authorities in state-based resource governance 
institutions will not necessarily improve the environmental management of the sector or the social 
conditions of the participants. But what is certain is that business-as-usual decentralization reforms 
are unlikely to have any substantive impact on the ASM sector unless traditional authorities are 
brought into policy discussions.  
Incorporating normative principles of accountability and transparency with traditional authority 
poses significant challenges. Fostering and supporting frank political discussions between state 
institutions and traditional authorities on resource-use debates is an essential first step in addressing 
the root of governance deficiencies in the ASM sector. However, strategies for integrating traditional 
and emerging sources of authority, which do not necessarily correspond to the democratic reforms 
of local government institutions, and addressing the numerous other challenges outlined in this 
section are neither easily formulated nor immediately apparent. Including traditional authorities in 
the formal governance of ASM would, at least, add some legitimacy to the notion that 
decentralization increases meaningful participation in resource governance.  
 
5. Conclusion 
                                                          
14 The term ‘chieftaincy issues’ is widely used to refer to issues regarding land ownership and chiefly 
jurisdiction. The situation is further complicated in the case of ASM as the management of minerals, however, 
is not a chieftaincy issue, as minerals are vested in the president.  
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This paper contributes to the understanding of ASM in Ghana, and elsewhere, by assessing the 
influence of decentralization reforms on the sector and articulating the complexity of related local 
political dynamics. Despite being endowed with overall responsibility for development, the role of 
local government in controlling and regulating ASM activities has been undermined by weak 
decentralization. Particularly, in the case of reviewing small-scale mining applications, the 
concentration of power within the centrally appointed District Chief Executive undermines the 
participation of the resource-users, traditional authorities and assembly members. Furthermore, 
District Assemblies complicate ASM governance as political actors seek to gain economic and 
political rents from the sector. 
The informal nature of most ASM operations prevents the inclusion of key actors in formal 
decentralized governance institutions and obscures the sector’s operations. The need to balance 
considerations of the negative environmental and social impacts with the substantial local economic 
benefits further complicates analysis of the sector as local authorities adopt ambiguous and 
contradictory positions towards its activities. This situation typifies how, instead of delivering 
improved accountability, transparency and responsiveness of governance, decentralization has 
actually increased the complexity of resource management contexts. The findings also re-iterate the 
failure of ASM policies in Ghana to capture the reality of the sector’s dynamics.  
If future decentralization reforms are to be expected to improve the governance and management 
of ASM, then addressing the challenge of integrating traditional and state authorities requires 
explicit attention. Although small-scale miners’ associations potentially represent institutions which 
could bridge the current impasse in the ASM sector, the reluctance of donors to acknowledge these 
challenges, typified by the omission of chiefs from the NREG program in Ghana, simply serves to 
divert attention away from foundational questions of governance and postpone over-due 
deliberations. This contention reflects Mohan’s [51] argument, presented almost two decades ago, 
that donor-led decentralization reforms compromise national sovereignty and that establishing and 
strengthening centralized sovereignty is essential in order to foster political debate on the structure 
of African states. In light of chronic resource management deficiencies, epitomized in the ASM 
sector, the need to open and engage in political debates on resource governance remains prevalent.  
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